THE NEW COAS – A TOUGH TASK AHEAD

B.RAMAN

Gen.V.K.Singh, who will be retiring as the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) on  May 31,2012, will go down in history as a highly competent General, who did not deserve to be the head of the proud Indian Army despite his excellent record in the battle-field against our adversaries.

2. He proved during the last months of his tenure that to command the Indian Army, one’s professional qualities and battle-field achievements alone are not sufficient. One requires leadership qualities like firmness in man management combined with fairness to subordinates and colleagues, discretion, an ability to win the respect of the colleagues and establish an atmosphere of trust with the political leadership.

3. India has been a successful democracy. Its success has been due to not only its voters and its electoral system, but also to the responsible behaviour of the heads of its institutional pillars. Our Army has always been one of the important institutional pillars of our nation and democracy.

4. In our 65 years of history as an independent nation, we have had instances of honest differences of opinion between the COAS and the political leadership and between the COAS and his senior colleagues. They were handled in a way   as they ought to be handled in a sensitive institution like the Army--- with a sense of balance, with mutual respect despite the differences, with discretion and away from the glare of publicity. We, the people, became aware of such instances long after the COAS concerned had gone into superannuation.

5. It went to the credit of those chiefs that they saw to it that their differences did not damage the trust of the political leadership and the public in our proud Army. An Army marches on its pride and its image in the eyes of the public. If the pride and the image are damaged, even the best of weapons and training will be of little avail in maintaining the battle-hardiness of the Army.

6. In his last months as the chief, Gen.V.K.Singh played to the gallery and exhibited in public a viciousness towards some of his senior colleagues, the like of which will not do credit to any institution, particularly the Army. We have had instances of viciousness in leadership in other institutions of the Government of India dealing with national security, but such viciousness was never exhibited in public and did not make the institutions the laughing stock of the public.

7. Firmness and fairness in man management is the most important quality the heads of the Armed Forces should have. The esprit de corps, which keeps them fighting fit all the time and under all circumstances, depends on those qualities.

8. Gen.Singh  showed himself to be lacking in those qualities. The Indian Army, that has never been accused or suspected of factionalism, became a breeding ground of factionalism. The relationship of mutual trust and mutual respect between the political and military leadership which has been the bedrock of our successful democracy stands eroded.

9. Over the years, there has been a demand from strategic analysts in the country for giving our Armed Forces a greater role in decision and policy making in national security matters on par with practices in Western democracies. The Government of Dr.Manmohan Singh had initiated a major exercise to see how this can be done.

10.Any decision to give the Armed Forces a greater role in decision and policy-making in defence and national security related matters has to be that of the political leadership. It would depend on its confidence in the sense of balance, discretion and responsibility of the military leadership.

11. That confidence is likely to have been eroded by the way Gen.Singh conducted himself in his sunset months as the COAS. A major casualty of his behaviour could be the exercise to associate the military leadership with policy and decision making in an increasing measure.

12. The last months of Gen.Singh as the COAS were a bad dream for the country. It is hoped that his successor  will repair  the damage quickly and make the Army once again one of the important institutional pillars of our democracy and re-establish its esprit de corps. ( 27-5-12)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )

PM SHOULD GIFT GENERATORS TO MYANMAR

B.RAMAN

Reports from Myanmar indicate that during his visit to Myanmar next week, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh will be meeting Aung San Suu Kyi at Yangon (Rangoon) on May 29,2012. She has reportedly re-scheduled a visit to Bangkok, her first visit abroad since her release from house-arrest, in order to be available at Yangon for meeting our Prime Minister.

2. This gesture of hers is indicative of the importance attached by her to Myanmar’s relations with India despite her past unhappiness over India’s close relations with the military junta that ruled the country till the end of 2010.

3. The Prime Minister’s visit comes at a time when there are reports of spreading public unrest over severe power-cuts in many towns. The unrest in the form of street demonstrations first started in Mandalay and from there has since  spread to Pegu, Monywa and Yangon.The protesters have not taken the permission of the Police for holding demonstrations which is an offence, but the Government has chosen to ignore the violation of the law in order not to provoke them further. The protesters have been using their restricted access to Facebook and Twitter to call upon people in other towns to demonstrate.

4.It is not yet clear whether the street demonstrations are spontaneous or have been instigated by anti-democracy hawks in the Army to weaken the position of the Thein Sein Government which has been steadily moving towards greater political reforms and opening-out to the world.

5. However, in an attempt to project the demonstrations as spontaneous, the protesters have accused  the former military government  of selling off natural gas reserves to China and pocketing the profits, while  75 per cent of the local people have no access to electricity. Electricity consumption in  Myanmar averages 104 kilowatts an hour per person—one of the lowest in the world.

6.Speaking during the opening of a local office of her National League For Democracy (NLD) on May 22,2012, Suu Kyi said that the  power shortages were the  direct result of government mismanagement and called upon the Government  to give priority to increasing the power supply and to creating jobs for the unemployed youth.

7.The Government announced  on May 23  that it was purchasing  six generators from U.S.-based Caterpillar Inc., which will be air-freighted within a week, and two 25-megawatt gas-turbines to be bought from General Electric Co. The Government has blamed the Kachin insurgency for severely damaging electricity production and distribution.

8.During his visit, our Prime Minister should offer to help the Myanmar Government on an emergency basis to increase the power supply and also gift a plane-load of generators of the required capacity needed by the Government. The Prime Minister could also offer a special credit to enable the Government to repair the damages to the power infrastructure. ( 26-5-12)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )

MODERNISATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY APPARATUS

B.RAMAN

The Government of India has taken the first important step towards the modernisation of our national security apparatus by commissioning a study of the apparatus as it stands today and as it ought to be to counter likely future threats from other States and non-State actors.

2.The exhaustive study, lasting nearly 10 months, was undertaken by a special Task Force headed by Shri Naresh Chandra, who has had the distinction of having served as the Defence Secretary, the Home Secretary and the Cabinet Secretary as well as the Governor of Rajasthan and our Ambassador to the US during the critical period following our nuclear tests of 1998. He is, therefore, no stranger to the internal and external aspects of national security and to the linkages between national security and national strength. The report of the Task Force was submitted to the Prime Minister on May 23,2012.

3. The exercise has now moved into the second and even more important step of implementation. Any exercise of this nature, however comprehensive, will be fruitful only if the acceptable recommendations are quickly identified and prioritised and action taken for their timely implementation.

4. The exercise entrusted by the Government to the Task Force was not a post-mortem necessitated by any national security failure or set-back. It was a forward-looking exercise meant to visualise the likely  national security tasks of the future keeping in view the evolving threats to national security as well as our requirements as a major power in the years to come.

5. The exercise undertaken by the Task Force had its tactical as well as strategic components. The tactical component related to identifying the gaps and deficiencies of today in national security management and recommending measures to remove them.

6. The strategic component had an element of vision about it. How is the security scenario likely to evolve in the foreseeable future? What kind of new threats and vulnerabilities are likely to arise for which we have to be prepared? How to create a modern national security apparatus befitting India’s status as a major power and how to find the resources for it? These were some of the questions that have been sought to be addressed by the Task Force.

7. Such exercises are undertaken regularly in the US and other Western countries every time a new Head of State or Government assumes office. This is the first time that such an exercise has been undertaken in our country since we became independent in 1947. It is to be hoped that this will become a regular feature and that such an exercise to ensure a steady modernisation of our national security apparatus will be undertaken at least once in 10 years.

8. National strength and national security go hand in hand. Without comprehensive national strength there cannot be comprehensive national security and vice versa. Resource priorities for the modernisation of the national security apparatus in a developing country like India cannot be the same as in Western developed countries.

9. In a country like ours the requirements of the people have to have the first priority. Even while not neglecting this, one has to find the resources for constantly upgrading our national security apparatus. How to do this? That is a difficult and complex question to which the answer has to be found by the political leadership on the basis of the various options identified by the professional experts---serving and retired. It is important to work towards a national political and intellectual consensus on the need for a time-bound modernisation of our national security apparatus and for finding the required material and human resources even while not overlooking the priorities for the common man.

10. While it is for the Government to decide on the drill to be followed for the implementation of the Task Force report, three aspects to be kept in view may be underlined:

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 Firstly, the need to take the public into confidence to the extent possible on the main features of this exercise so that it has broad public support.

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Secondly, the need to ensure institutional and political consensus at every stage of the implementation.

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Thirdly, the need for a standing mechanism to monitor the implementation process.

11. It would be neither possible nor advisable to make the entire report of the Task Force available in the public domain. Its assessment of the external security scenario is sensitive and could have a negative impact on our diplomacy if made available in the public domain. But its assessment of the internal security scenario and resource constraints could be made available in the public domain after suitable editing.

12. The implementation process cannot be satisfactory unless all Government departments and institutions that might be affected by the implementation positively or negatively co-operate in the implementation exercise. If they co-operate only in respect of those recommendations that are favourable them and oppose those that are not favourable, the implementation will be half-hearted. A political consensus at the central level and between the Centre and the States would smoothen the implementation process.

13. The monitoring of the implementation by the National Security Council Secretariat or by any other suitable mechanism would ensure that the recommendations do not fall in limbo. ( 25-5-12)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75  )

R&AW: AN OCCUPATIONAL HAZARD

B.RAMAN

The R&AW has been the target of considerable criticism in sections of our media over what they have perceived as its serious blunder in disseminating a HUMINT report regarding plans of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the Pakistani terrorist organisation, to carry out major acts of catastrophic terrorism in Gujarat and Mumbai. There has even been a campaign of ridicule against the organisation which has been sought to be projected as nincompoop.

2. “The Hindu” of May 11,2012, has carried an eight-column report on Page 15 under the title
“R&AW Left With Egg on Its Face As Terror Plot Unravels” contributed jointly by Praveen Swami, who enjoys a tremendous reputation in media circles of New Delhi, and his colleague Muhammad Ali.

3. To quote from the first para of the report: “ The Research & Analysis Wing, India’s external intelligence service, is facing allegations of incompetence after three Lashkar-e-Toiba operatives who, it claimed, were about to conduct  a suicide squad operation in Western India turned out to be living at their home in Lahore and to be businessmen, not terrorists.” This gives the essential gist of the story.

4.There has been a negative projection of the R&AW not only by “The Hindu”, but also by others. Along with its HUMINT report, the R&AW had disseminated pics of the three alleged terrorists of the LET who, according to it, had infiltrated into India along with two others to carry out the feared acts of terrorism. The Mumbai Police correctly released to the public the salient points of the report along with the pics as received from the R&AW. These pics were carried by a journal of Delhi on its web site. The three persons concerned, living in Lahore, thereupon appeared in public in Lahore and sought to ridicule the R&AW.

5. The definite embarrassment to the R&AW has been sought to be exploited  in Pakistan for discrediting it. It has been projected as an example of the kind of baseless reports which the agency disseminates regarding terrorism allegedly emanating from Pakistan. The main objective of the campaign in Pakistan has been to discredit the R&AW in the eyes of the Indian public and the international community and to project its reporting on Pakistan-based terrorism as untrustworthy.

6. The brunt of the criticism in the Indian media has been over what many have seen as the propensity of the R&AW to disseminate uncorroborated reports and create false alarms and its perceived naivete in walking into a trap laid from Pakistan.

7.There are certain standard operating procedures followed by intelligence and security agencies all over the world regarding the handling of HUMINT or TECHINT reports which speak of an imminent act of terrorism. The most important point of this procedure is: Act on the report as if it is true until or unless it is proved to be false. Hence, all intelligence agencies immediately disseminate such reports with appropriate qualifications and simultaneously undertake a verification to establish the veracity of the report. If the veracity is not established, they call off the alert.

8. That is exactly what the R&AW has done and it would be totally uncharitable and unprofessional to find fault with it and ridicule it for doing what it was expected to do under the standard operating procedures. If one reprimands and ridicules an agency for doing what it was required to do because its report proved to be incorrect, it could hesitate in future to sound alerts on the receipt of HUMINT reports and that could prove catastrophic.

9. That is what those orchestrating the anti-R&AW campaign from Pakistan--- whether the Inter-Services Intelligence or the LET or both—want---- to create in the R&AW a mental hesitation in disseminating future HUMINT reports so that they can take advantage of it for carrying out an act of terrorism. The R&AW officers should not let themselves be inhibited from future reporting because of this campaign against it in Pakistan as well as in sections of the Indian media.

10. At the same time, there are some disturbing follow-up questions arising from this incident that need to be attended to. The first question is who was the human source--- is he a trans-border source or one based in Pakistan or some third country? If he is a trans-border source, is he based in India or Pakistan? The second question is, is he a new and untested source or is he an old and tested source?

11. If he is a new and untested Pakistani source, all that the R&AW has to do is to discard him. If he is an Indian source, there could be reason to suspect that he is a Pakistani mole. He would need to be arrested and interrogated .

12. If the source---whether Indian or Pakistani---is an old source all his past reports need to be re-examined in order to see whether any action had been taken against  any Indian national on the basis of reports from this source who has now turned out to be tainted.

13. The other aspect needing attention is how did those behind the campaign in Pakistan notice so quickly the pics released by the Mumbai Police, unless they were expecting this to happen, and exploited it to embarrass the R&AW. This would clearly show a well-planned and well-executed operation to damage the reputation of the R&AW.

14.Normally, it may not be possible to carry out such operations without the support of accomplices in India. Are there such accomplices who played a role in this?

15.Incidents such as these are occupational hazards in the intelligence profession. This is not the first time this has been happening. We have had such incidents in the days of  Khalistani  terrorism. This is not the last time this will be happening.

16. There is no need for the R&AW to be defensive or be apologetic about it. It should take it in its stride and hold a thorough enquiry into the whole affair to avoid the possibilities of such incidents in future. ( 12-5-12)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )